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In the Supreme Court
of the

State of Utah
MAX MARKUS

Plaintiff,
vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, Utah Copper Division,

Case No. 8512

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Max Markus, is a middle aged man of forty
seven ( 47) years with a grammar school education and was,
prior to his injury, a laborer by occupation. Plaintiff has no
trade or skill with which to earn a living that does not require
the use of his back (R. 48 & 49).
On or about the 17th day of June, 1952, plaintiff was in
the employ of Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Copper
Division, one of the defendants herein, at Bingham Canyon,
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"T....._ :_ _ _ _ _ _ml::_.·,.,,

Utah, as a track hand in the open pit copper mine. While
engaged in said employment on said date plaintiff suffered
an injury to his back when a rail, which he was carrying together with eleven ( 11) other men on the track gang, was
dropped without warning to the plaintiff (R. 5, 14, 29 & 96).
That on October 27, 1952, the Industrial Commission determined that a surgical procedure was necessary to correct
plaintiff's complaints of his back injury (R. 16). On or about
April 1, 1953, an operation was performed on his back by
Dr. Pemberton (R. 29, 31 & 50). Upon return to work, plaintiff suffered injuries to his back on two (2) other occasions:
Once while shoveling snow, and again by slipping on a trail
(R. 98, 100 & 101).
On June 19, 1954, plaintiff again appeared before the
Medical Advisory Board and it was determined that plaintiff
must have another operation on his back (R. 33 & 34). The
Commission granted to plaintiff his choice of doctor, to wit:
Dr. Reed S. Clegg, orthopedic surgeon (R. 35). Another spine
fusion operation was performed on the plaintiff on the 8th
day of September, 1954, by Dr. Clegg (R. 74). This was the
third operation on his back, plaintiff having been operated
upon in 1949, arising out of a back injury suffered while working on a construction job prior to his employment by Kennecott Copper Corporation (R. 83).
On July 30, 1955, the Medical Advisory Board determined
plaintiff's permanent partial loss of bodily function at twentyfive per cent (25%) (R. 40).
A formal hearing was requested and said hearing was duly
held on the 27th day of October, 1955, where the issue to be
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determined was plaintiff's extent of permanent partial disability (R. 46 & 47).
The medical evidence adduced at said hearing clearly set
forth the basic fact that the back is synonymous and equal to
the body as a whole (R. 63 & 74), and a disability rating
of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the back is equivalent to
twenty-five per cent (25%) disability of total bodily function
(R. 75).
The medical evidence further adduced the uncontroverted
fact that a twenty-five per cent (25%) permanent partial
disability of the back (or bodily function) was a more serious
disability than the loss of a person's thumb at the metacarpal
bone (R. 64 & 75). The loss of a thumb at the metacarpal
bone is a scheduled loss entitling a person to an award of
sixty ( 60) weeks. (Title 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
Upon conclusion of said hearing, on the 9th day of January, 1956, the Industrial Commission adopted the Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
Referee and ordered Kennecott Copper Corporation to pay the
said Max Markus fifty (50) weeks of compensation, together
with medical and hospital expenses. Said fifty (50) weeks'
compensation was based on a finding of twenty-five per cent
(25%) loss of bodily function (R. 86 & 87).
The Industrial Commission's arrival of fifty (50) weeks'
compensation is based solely upon a mathematical calculation
of what twenty-five per cent (25%) is to two hundred (200)
weeks (the maximum award for permanent partial disability)
(R. 86 & 87).
5
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An application for rehearing was duly filed by plaintiff
asserting that the award made was based upon a misinterpretation of applicable law and was wholly unsubstantiated by
the facts in the case (R. 88). Said application for rehearing
was denied (R. 90). Hence plaintiff's present application for
Writ of Certiorari for review of the case (R. 104 & 108).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I.
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF FIFTY (50} WEEKS' COMPENSATION IS GROSSLY
INADEQUATE AND INEQUITABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S
DISABILITY AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

POINT NO. II.
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
IS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SAID AWARD.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL C011MISSIO:N
OF FIFTY (50} WEEKS' COMPENSATION IS GROSSLY
INADEQUATE AND INEQUITABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S
DISABILITY AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
6
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A careful and complete rev1ew of the record will conclusively show an absolute and complete absence of any evidence supporting the Commission's ridiculously low award of
only fifty (50) weeks' compensation for plaintiff's twenty-five
per cent (25%) loss of bodily function.
The record shows, on the other hand, th~t the plaintiff
is a middle-aged man of forty-seven ( 47) years, has only a
fifth grade education, a laborer by occupation and a man of
no skills or training to provide a livelihood without the use
of his back (R. 48 & 49). The plaintiff has received extremely
unsympathetic treatment and poor diagnosis of injury and
recommended treatment from defendant company's doctors
(R. 29). He has had to constantly employ all of his legal
remedies through the Industrial Commission in order to receive temporary total disability and adequate surgery and
medical care (R. 35 & 36). He is now industrially unemployable and is admittedly of great handicap and disability as
clearly shown by defendant's own company doctor in a letter
written on March 29, 1955, to his superiors and incorporated
in the Report of Hearing as Exhibit #1 (R. 83). For your
convenience, your writer will quote from this letter, as follows:
" ... Mr. Max Markus, Payroll Number 1143, was
in my office yesterday March 28th, 1955, to obtain a
release for light work at the Mines.
"This employee has had three previous fusion operations on his spine. He is now under the care of Dr.
Reed S. Clegg, Salt Lake City, Utah, and although I
have a letter from Dr. Clegg advising that Mr. Markus
be given light work, I feel Dr. Cle_gg does not appreciate the working conditions here at the Mine.
_,

,
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"It has been my experience that a patient such as
Max Markus, could get an exacerbation of his back
symptoms by getting on and off a train, slipping or
tripping over a rock or a rail, or numerous other ways.
Because of this I can not honestly release this man for
either regular or light work.
'The above was explained fully to the patient, as
well as the reasons on which my opinion was based.
Sincerely,
H. C. JENKINS, M.D."
The only scheduled loss in Title 35-1-66, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which is at all comparable to a disability
rating of fifty (50) weeks is the loss of one ( 1) thumb and
the metacarpal bone thereof which gives rise to sixty ( 60)
weeks' compensation. Both Dr. Jenkins, defendant company's
physician, and Dr. Reed S. Clegg, an orthopedic surgeon,
clearly expressed opinions that plaintiff's twenty-five per cent
(25%) loss of bodily function was more serious than the
above named scheduled loss (R. 64 & 75). In fact, plaintiff's
loss was more comparable to the scheduled loss of one ( 1)
arm at or near the shoulder which gives rise to an award of
two hundred (200) weeks (R. 64 & 75) .
It is common knowledge and established without contradiction of medical evidence adduced at the hearing that a one
hundred per cent (100%) loss of function of a person's back
is equal to one hundred per cent ( 100%) loss of bodily
function and that twenty-five per cent (25%) loss of function
of the back (instant case) is equal to twenty-five per cent
(25%) loss of bodily function (R. 63, 74 & 75). The Legislature has recognized that the loss of an arm at the shoulder
8
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is not total disability and has rated said loss at two hundred
( 200) weeks. The Court can, therefore, actually take judicial
notice of the fact that plaintiff's disability rating of twentyfive per cent (25%) loss of bodily function is greater than
twenty-five per cent (25%) loss of function of one ( 1) arm.
A proper evaluation of the disability of this man would be to
determine the amount of compensation for permanent total
disability and then take twenty-five per cent (25%) of said
total disability '!S the award to be made, but not to exceed two
hundred ( 200) weeks, the maximum award for permanent
partial disability.

POINT NO. II.
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
IS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SAID AWARD.
The Industrial Commission has adopted the rule of determining the amount of an award for permanent partial disability in this case involving a back injury of an unscheduled
loss by the simple use of an arbitrary and inequitable arithmetical computation. In other words, the Industrial Commission takes the maximum amount of permanent partial disability
of two hundred ( 200) weeks as set up by statute and multiplies said maximum by the amount of determined percentage
loss of bodily function. For example, it has been found that
the amount of bodliy function of the plaintiff herein is twentyfive per cent ( 2 5%), therefore, two hundred ( 200) weeks

9
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multiplied by twenty-five per cent (25%) equals fifty (50)
weeks.
The main issue of this appeal is therefore quite clear.
Has the Industrial Commission correctly interpreted the law
applicable in the determination of the amount of said award
in the instant case?
The applicable provision of Title 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is as follows:
"For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily
function not otherwise provided for herein, such period
of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this
section but not exceeding in any case two hundred
weeks.
"The amounts specified in this section are all subject
to the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount
payable as specified in this section, and in no event
shall more than a total of $6250.00 be required to be
paid."
In the case of injuries to the back, injuries to the head,
or injuries to other vital organs of the body, not specifically
scheduled by the Legislature, an interpretation of the above
statute as the Industrial Commission has given to it leads to
great inconvenience to persons suffering such injuries and yields
apparent inequitable and absurd consequences. To fully illustrate the point, suppose a man had seventy-five per cent (75%)
permanent loss of bodily function of the back. For practical
purposes such a man would be nearly, or if not so, totally
disabled. Yet a single arithmetical computation would yield
10
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only one hundred fifty (150) weeks of compensation, or the
same as the loss of one ( 1) hand in the scheduled losses.
It is stated in 58 Am. Jur. 28 at page 594, as follows:
"When great inconvenience of absurd consequences
will result from a particular construction, that construction should be avoided, unless the meaning of the
legislature be so plain and manifest that avoidance is
impossible."
It has been clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court of
Utah that statutes dealing with the Workmen's Compensation
Act must be liberally constru_ed. See Chandler vs. Industrial
Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 Pac. 1020, 8 ALR 930, wherein
said Act was construed in favor of employees and death beneficiaries.

In another early case of North Beck Mining Company v.
Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 486, 200 Pac. 111, 112, Justice
Weber said in a unanimous opinion, as follows:
"The Industrial Act, including the procedure therein
provided, must be liberally construed, and with the
purpose of effectuating its beneficent and humane objects."
This case also stressed the man's occupation (a miner)
m determining the award and the Court even took judicial
notice of his loss.
A careful reading of the statute with the above legal
guides of interpretation in mind clearly shows that the Legislature intended, in the case of unscheduled losses, for the
Industrial Commission to arrive at a fair and equitable award
and to use the scheduled losses only as a guide as to comparable
11
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seriousness with the limitation that the lJ?.aximum award for
any unscheduled loss should not exceed two hundred ( 200)
weeks. As in the insta~t case the Industrial Commission should
have attempted to compare the seriousness of twenty-five per
cent (25%) loss of bodily injury of a laborer to a comparable
scheduled loss of equal seriousness and not consider two hundred (200) weeks as equivalent to total loss of bodily function.
We invite the Court's attention to one of its own cases
which is directly in point with the instant case and because of
its importance we are compell~d to quote at length from the
case of Silver King Coalition Mines Company vs. Industrial
Commission, 92 Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608, wherein Justice Wolfe
in a unanimous decision discusses the issue at hand and very
effectively sets forth the correct interpretation of this statute
and the reasons therefore. We quote from pages 613 and 614
of the Pacific Reporter citation above:
" ... The compensation for permanent partial disability is measured either by the schedule or in proportion thereto and as deemed equitable on the loss of
bodily functions alone, and the maximum is 200 weeks.
But if the applicants claims total and permanent disability the issue is as to whether he is totally and permanently disabled industrially and economically. There
is a twilight zone where one blends into the other.
That is, the loss of bodily function may be so great
as to leave one totally and permanently disabled industrially. Thus a person with a 90 per cent. loss of
bodily function might be able to prove himself totally
and permanently disabled. If so, he would take himself out of the class of applicants limited to recover
under the paragraph of section 42-1-62, above quoted,
and put himself in the class where his compensation
12
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should be determined by his total lack of industrial or
economical ability. But until that point is reached, the
permanent partial disability is seemingly compensated
for on loss of bodily function alone with a maximum
of 200 weeks. The fact that a workman may stop in
the zone of permanent partial, not quite going over
into the zone of permanent total, and therefore obtain
a maximum of only 200 weeks, whereas, a trifle more
disability would bring him into what the commission
might find as a fact to be an industrial or economic
permanent total giving him 260 weeks plus 45 per cent.
for the remainder of his life, leads us to wonder
whether this 200 weeks' maximum is supposed to be
the equivalent to a total loss of bodily function as the
commission seemed to conceive it in this case. The
applicant had a loss of bodily function of 70 per cent.
The commission, therefore, gave him 140 weeks' compensation on the theory evidently that if he had 100
per cent. loss of bodily function he would have been
entitled to 200 weeks. But certainly if he had had a
100 per cent. loss of bodily function he would have
been totally permanently disabled industrially and economically and therefore be entitled to compensation
for the rest of his life.
"There is nothing in the last paragraph of section
42-1-62 which requires that the number of weeks of

compensation to be given under this paragraph for permanent partial disability shall be to 200 weeks as the
loss of bodily function is to the full bodily function.
The requirement is that it shall be as the 'commission
shall deem equitable,' circumscribed by the requirement that it be in proportion to compensation in other
cases. The maximum contained in the schedule is 200
weeks for the loss of an arm. The loss of an arm would
not be a total loss of bodily function. It is therefore
odd that in the unscheduled types of loss of bodily
member or loss of bodily function the commission

13
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should assume that the maximum of 200 weeks is to
be taken as the equivalent of a total loss of bodily
function. It would not seem to be necessary for a person
to have a 70 per cent. loss of bodily function to obtain
140 weeks of compensation. He might have such percentage of loss and obtain 200 weeks if the loss of
function was comparable to the loss of function suffered by the loss of an arm at or near the shoulder or
comparable thereto. And, put in another way, the applicant in this case might suffer a 50 per cent. loss of
bodily function and be granted 140 weeks if it was
comparable to the loss of a leg between the knee and
the ankle, which yields in the schedule 140 weeks,
because it must be in 'proportion to the compensation
in other cases'; such loss of a leg being one of the
other cases. Or, if it were somewhat less than the
equivalent of the loss of function entailed by the loss
of a hand, which yields 158 weeks, it would be in proportion. The mere fact that there was medical testimony
that the loss was 50 per cent. of the full bodily function
would not necessarily make an award of 140 weeks
erroneous. Perhaps the loss of a leg between the knee
and the ankle does not involve more than 50 per cent.
loss of total bodily function" ...

CONCLUSION
The instant case is of great importance, not only to plaintiff
herein, who is seeking his proper and just relief, but also to all
other injured employees who may follow him with injuries to
vital organs of the body and not listed as a scheduled loss.
This is especially true in this era where back injuries are coming before the Industrial Commission with greater frequency
14
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due to better diagnostic and surgical procedures developed by
the orthopedic surgeons.
The full use of a person's back is of great importance and
especially is this true of a laborer. Once a man has had a back
operation and has not been re-employed by his employer, as
in this case, he practically finds it impossible to obtain new
employment wherein the full use of the back is of any importance. Employers refuse to take chances on employees with
back injuries.
Here in this case the Industrial Commission has made an
award which is not supported by evidence, and such an award
is inequitable and has led to a great injustice to the plaintiff
and to an absurd consequence. That the interpretation of the
applicable law in this case as made by the Industrial Commission is erroneous and not in keeping with the interpretation
as set forth by this Court.
In the interst of justice to the plaintiff and of others to
follow him, this writer urges the Honorable Supreme Court
to carefully inspect the record and judiciously read the applicable statute and return this case to the Industrial Commission
for a determination of a just and equitable award with the
proper instructions as to the manner of accomplishing same.
Respectfully submitted,
DAHL AND SAGERS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
EVERETT E. DAHL
VICTOR G. SAGERS
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